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Note
For the Children: Intentional and Functional
Approaches to Same-Sex Parentage in Connecticut
HANNAH KALICHMAN
Despite major progress that Connecticut has made in recent years towards
achieving marriage equality, there is still a large disparity in the legal treatment of
Connecticut parents based on their sexual orientation. Many family law doctrines
regarding parentage are entrenched in “traditional” heteronormative definitions of
marriage and family, despite changes in the legal recognition of marriage.
Furthermore, certain doctrines, such as the presumption of legitimacy, maintain the
narrative of a child only belonging to one mother and one father in the context of a
marriage. Understandings of what it means to be a family are shifting. In 2019, the
adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2017 was proposed in the Connecticut
General Assembly. Unfortunately, the legislation died in committee. The Uniform
Parentage Act would eliminate many barriers that same-sex parents face, such as
replacing gendered statutory language such as “mother” or “father” with simply
“parent.” The Act would also provide a regulatory structure through which
definitions of parentage could be broadened to include functional and intentional
parents within Connecticut’s statutory scheme. This Note argues that current
constructions of parentage in society are far too limited and often do more harm to
the child than good. Therefore, this Note advocates for the adoption of the Uniform
Parentage Act of 2017 in Connecticut. Particularly, this Note outlines the benefits
of expanding the legal definition of parent to include more modern realities of family
formation such as those who were intended to be parents to a child and those who
functioned as a parent in the child’s life. Furthermore, this Note was written with
future Connecticut legislation in mind and therefore seeks to provide a broad
overview of the history and legal doctrine of marriage as well as the practical
implications of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2017.
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For the Children: Intentional and Functional
Approaches to Same-Sex Parentage in Connecticut
HANNAH KALICHMAN *
INTRODUCTION
It is four years since the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 effectively invalidating state laws that, for
decades, denied marriage equality to same-sex couples.2 With a five-justice
majority, this landmark decision brought about strong social and political
reactions from both affirming and opposing groups.3 While the 2015 ruling
fundamentally changed marital rights across the country, Connecticut has
fully recognized same-sex marriages since its 2008 decision Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health.4 The recognition of same-sex marriages,
while an important development in American jurisprudence, was not enough
to truly bring same-sex couples to an equal status with different-sex
couples.5 This recognition, whether it be at the national or state level,
promptly brings a myriad of questions, such as: How does insurance
regulation apply to same-sex couples? What are spousal rights in health and
medical care? How does redefining marital rights impact social and legal
*

J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Connecticut School of Law. Recipient of the Best Student
Note Award. I would like to thank Professor Schmeiser for her unwavering support and advice
throughout this process. Also, thank you to Professor Chill for guiding me through law school and
sparking my interest in child law. I would also like to thank the members of Connecticut Law Review for
their tireless efforts and dedication. Thank you to my family and friends for their constant
encouragement. Specifically, thank you to my father, Seth, for instilling in me a passion to write from a
young age and to my mother, Moira, for teaching me to how to be an advocate.
1
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2
Id. at 2607.
3
Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207,
1209 (2016).
4
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
5
Throughout this Note, I will be referring to “same-sex” couples as an umbrella term to include
couples who identify as being of the same sex or gender. It is important to recognize that not all samesex or LGBTQ+ experiences are the same. While this Note references same-sex couples generally,
lesbian couples and gay-men couples have different experiences, as do individuals who do not identify
within the binary of male or female or who identify as trans*. For a full discussion regarding the
disparities in experiences for same-sex couples, see Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son:
Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 267 (2009).
To give an example, gay men are generally less likely to be able to adopt than lesbian couples. Id. at 268.
For the purposes of this Note, I will discuss same-sex couples more broadly, as the proposed functional
and intentional parentage definitions would perhaps address some of the disparities amongst same-sex
couples through gender neutral legislative language.
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definitions of family? More specifically, how are parental rights and custody
disputes impacted in the recognition of same-sex couples?
This Note aims to address same-sex parental rights and child custody in
Connecticut. While courts and legislatures have asserted that by legalizing
same-sex marriages they are declaring all married couples to be equal under
the law, the reality experienced by many families is starkly different. Those
who do not fit within the societally constructed categories of traditional
gender roles and norms often find significant obstacles in their path when
seeking parentage.6 Connecticut has attempted to sort out the question of
same-sex couples’ rights to children born during and outside of matrimony.7
Thus far, these attempts have fallen short of achieving truly equal treatment
for all families.
This Note examines the historical background of the various doctrines
associated with the institutions of marriage, parentage, and child custody.
Limited legal avenues are available to same-sex couples seeking parentage.
Beyond biology, there are currently two main routes to parentage: (1)
prearranged agreements such as adoption or surrogacy and (2) marriage to a
woman who bears a child. The latter occurs through the presumption of
legitimacy or marital presumption. This presumption grants parental rights
to the partner, historically the husband, of a woman who bears a child.8
Courts and legislatures alike continue to grapple with the presumption of
legitimacy and related questions of parentage in the context of same-sex
couples. Questions surrounding what defines a parent and how parentage is
established under the law are complex and deeply personal. The challenge
behind applying this presumption is the inherent case-by-case nature of
family law questions.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a historical overview
of marriage and family in the United States, specifically elaborating a broad,
and admittedly abridged, national history of how civil rights, marriage, and
parentage have developed within their respective doctrines over the years.
In her comprehensive book, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the
Nation, Nancy Cott provides extensive insight into the national history of
marriage.9 However, this Note does not attempt to cover every aspect of
marital history, but instead seeks to provide a sufficient overview of the
evolution of marital legislation and jurisprudence so as to set the backdrop
for further analysis. Part II discusses traditional models of defining
parentage and their shortcomings when applied to same-sex couples. Part III
6
7

Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2266 (2017).
Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16,

2015).
8
Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1190
(2016).
9
For a comprehensive account of the history of marriage in the United States, see generally NANCY
F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 1–2 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000).
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specifically addresses the rights of same-sex couples and current routes to
parentage in Connecticut. Part IV introduces the Uniform Parentage Act and
its application in other states, as well as Connecticut’s own steps toward
adopting it. Part IV also provides two proposals for legislative change in
Connecticut.
Instead of relying on antiquated doctrines, such as the presumption of
legitimacy, that are ill-fitted for modern definitions of family, this Note calls
for the implementation of intentional and functional definitions of parentage.
Specifically, Connecticut should adopt relevant provisions of the Uniform
Parentage Act (2017) (UPA (2017)),10 so as to finally have a comprehensive
legal scheme through which to define parentage. The writing of this Note is
particularly timely given the recent attention that the UPA (2017) has
garnered in the Connecticut legislature.11 While no bill is currently on the
floor as of the writing of this Note, it was with potential legislation in mind
that this Note was constructed. Hopefully, the following discussion will
contribute to Connecticut’s legislative process in considering whether to
adopt certain provisions of the UPA (2017).
It is time for Connecticut law to recognize same-sex relationships as
legitimate beyond a marriage license and fully deserving of recognition and
protection under the law when seeking legal parentage. No longer is it
sufficient to fit same-sex parents into the margins, including them via proxy
and stretching outdated doctrine to fit their situation, as if they were an
exception to the norm. Same-sex couples are fully capable parents and
should be recognized as such.12 With implementation of the UPA (2017)
provisions in Connecticut, parentage would no longer be limited to the
notion that a parent is someone who has passed on genetic material to their
offspring. Instead, there would be a recognition of the role of the parent, the
importance of the parent-child relationship, and a true focus on the best
interests and welfare of the child.
I. MARRIAGE AND FAMILY: A NATIONAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Marriage and family, while fundamentally private aspects of life,
undeniably thrust individuals into the public sphere. Marriage in the United
States, and by extension family, have been repeatedly described as central
to society.13 Courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have
10

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
Until February 2019, Connecticut had a bill, Proposed Bill No. 6507, in committee that outlined
the adoption of the UPA (2017). Proposed H.B. No. 6507 Session Year 2019, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_num=HB06507&whi
ch_year=2019 (last visited Jan. 4, 2020).
12
William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America’s
Children, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 103–04 (2005).
13
See COTT, supra note 9, at 3 (describing marriage as an institution that influences societal
formation).
11
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struggled to come to terms with a definition of family that is both clear and
flexible to meet the modern legal needs and rights of individuals.
Historically, a family was defined strictly in the nuclear sense, being
comprised of a husband, wife, and their legitimate children.14 This
traditional definition has proven problematic as families have morphed
beyond such a narrow conceptualization, especially in recent years.15 Within
the family structure, other definitions have shifted as legal doctrines have
evolved. Both the doctrines of marriage and family are still changing. For
example, marriage no longer defines women as the property of men and
marital rape has only recently been recognized as a crime within American
penal codes.16
A. A Brief History of Marriage in the United States
Marriage, while a personal declaration of love and commitment between
individuals, is also influenced by public attitudes and acceptance. 17 Since the
founding of the nation, marriage has been deeply entrenched in the national
narrative.18 Marriage sets boundaries for the roles prescribed to men and
women, culturally defines gender, and determines the very make-up of
families.19 Not only has marriage law defined gender, it also has had a major
role in defining race and drawing racial distinctions between groups.20 Some
marriages, such as those between Christian white men and white women,
have traditionally been protected whereas marriages outside of this narrow
construct have a history of being discouraged or banned.21 Marital regulation
draws stark lines defining what makes a legitimate family.22
Even in times of radical social change, from reconstruction to the Civil
Rights Movement, advocates did not dare go so far as to challenge the
institution of marriage and its inherent assumptions. For instance, during the
formation and passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, advocates were sure
to clarify that the language would not eliminate “other domestic relations.”23
It was not until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court held that states
14

See id. at 25 (describing nuclear family structures in America dating back to the Iroquois Nation).
Brief of Historians of Marriage & American Historical Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 4–6, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). See also Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977) (holding grandparents should be included in “family”).
16
COTT, supra note 9, at 211.
17
Id. at 2.
18
See id. at 9–10 (describing the various definitions of marriage in the United States during its
founding with the underpinning of acceptance and expectation that marriage be between a man and a
woman).
19
Id. at 4.
20
See id. (“Consequently, marriage has also been instrumental in articulating and structuring
distinctions grouped under the name of ‘race.’”).
21
COTT, supra note 9, at 3–5.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 80.
15
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could no longer restrict marriages between persons solely on the basis of
their race.24 By opining that this was a violation of both the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was
singling marriage out as a “fundamental freedom” that was implicit in the
concept of liberty.25 Specifically, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court held that
“[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very
existence and survival . . . . Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry,
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot
be infringed by the State.”26
While Loving proved to be some measure of legal protection for
interracial couples seeking to marry, the same cannot be said for same-sex
couples. Until 1973, homosexuality was defined as a mental illness.27 As late
as 2003, states were still allowed to criminalize sexual behavior associated
with same-sex relationships, particularly sexual acts between men.28
Reminiscent of the efforts of former slaves after the Civil War, same-sex
couples sought the legal recognition of marriage in part to demonstrate their
access to basic civil rights.29 By excluding same-sex couples from free
choice and equal marriages, same-sex relationships were stigmatized and
heterosexual supremacy was reinforced.30 Despite the lack of legal
protections for same-sex relationships, the decades following the 1960s
demonstrated major shifts in household demographics.31 Along with these
shifts in social structure came movement in some states towards recognizing
same-sex marriages under the principles of consent, freedom of choice, and
privacy.32
24

See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (overruling Pace v. Alabama, which upheld the
State of Alabama’s ban on interracial marriages).
25
Id.
26
Id. (citation omitted).
27
Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAV. SCI. 565, 565 (2015).
28
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that a law criminalizing sodomy
was constitutional and met rational basis review). Lawrence v. Texas held that the liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of consenting adults
to engage in intimate contact in the privacy of their own homes and that this right extended to same-sex
couples. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
29
COTT, supra note 9, at 216.
30
Rosky, supra note 5, at 273–74 n.77.
31
Unmarried couple households multiplied by almost ten times from 1960 to 1998, growing more
than five times faster than the number of households overall. However, by the end of the 1990s, marriage
no longer was the society milestone it once was considered to be. The proportion of adults declining to
marry rose from fifteen to twenty-three percent between 1972 and 1998. COTT, supra note 9, at 203.
32
In 1998, an Alaskan court ruled that the right to choose one’s life partner is constitutionally
fundamental under the state constitution. The court held that:
Government intrusion into the choice of a life partner encroaches on the intimate
personal decisions of the individual. . . . The relevant question is not whether samesex marriage is so rooted in our traditions that it is a fundamental right . . . but whether
the freedom to choose one’s life partner is so rooted in our traditions.
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Just as the first states, namely Alaska and Hawaii, began to broaden their
definitions of marriage to include same-sex couples, opponents of same-sex
marriage organized to maintain the heteronormative boundaries of
marriage.33 Between 1996 and 1997, twenty-four states passed legislation
effectively banning recognition of same-sex marriages, even when those
marriages may have been valid elsewhere. 34 In 1996, opposition groups
successfully stalled states from recognizing same-sex marriage with a
federal response in the form of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).35 This
Act described marriage under federal law as singularly between a man and
woman.36 DOMA further asserted that states are not required to recognize
out-of-state same-sex marriages.37 It was not until 2013 that the Supreme
Court declared DOMA to be unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor.38
The Court reviewed DOMA’s impact of denying a lesbian couple who were
married in Canada the same protections that different-sex married couples
received and determined that the Act violated the Constitution.39 The Court
reasoned that “DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States
Code.”40 Windsor highlighted the tension between the federal government’s
interest in protecting Due Process and Equal Protection of individuals and
states’ interest in making sovereign decisions over marriages within their
borders.41
Finally, in 2015, the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v.
Hodges42 held that states must issue marriage licenses and recognize lawful
out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples.43 While a major step towards
equality for same-sex couples, Obergefell has also garnered some concern
amongst advocates and scholars alike.44 By declaring marriage such a central
and fundamental institution within society, the Court arguably lowered the
status of nonmarital relationships.45 This is an important point that will be
relevant for the discussion of parentage. If marriage is considered central to
society by the Court and its status therefore lowers the importance of
Similarly, Hawaii converted the single route of heterosexual marriage to just one of a few forms of
marriage. Id. at 216–17 (quoting Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI., 1998 WL
88743, at *4–5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
33
Id. at 217.
34
See id. (“By the spring of 2000, a total of thirty-five of the fifty states had legislated their
unwillingness to recognize same-sex marriage.”).
35
Id. at 218.
36
COTT, supra note 9, at 218.
37
Id.
38
570 U.S. 744, 745 (2013).
39
Id. at 744–45.
40
Id. at 771.
41
Id. at 770.
42
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
43
Id. at 2607–08.
44
See Murray, supra note 3, at 1210 (discussing concerns surrounding the Obergefell decision).
45
Id.
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nonmarried couples’ relationships, the doctrine surrounding the protection
of parental rights becomes key when considering child custody, whether in
marriages or outside of them. Furthermore, recent demographic trends
reflect that marriage rates are declining,46 which raises the question as to
whether basing familial definitions along marital lines is the best approach.
These trends reflect the continued shifting shape and form of families in the
American household. What was once a strict nuclear definition of family in
the courts is now changing to embrace the diversity that is far more
representative of families’ realities.
B. Changes in Family Formation
While parentage may seem to be a straightforward biological concept,
the application of parentage doctrine is far more complex. Particularly in
recent years, courts have been confronted with a tension between two
models of parentage. One model revolves around the more “traditional”
dual-gendered, biological definition of parentage.47 The other model focuses
on the formation of chosen (intentional) and functional families.48 Social
constructions of gender, sexuality, race, and class have all impacted the laws
surrounding family formation and recognition.49 Much of family law is
rooted in heteronormative, classist, and racially hierarchical systems that do
not aim to recognize the majority of families within the United States.50
While family life is presumed to be private and confined to the home, the
public sphere plays an active role dictating what it means to be a family and
what rights families have.51 Generally, the state can, and often does, intrude
to rigidly define family construction and child custody.52 When a state does
become involved in questions of family construction, there inevitably is an
incursion into questions of state values that are certainly influenced by
societal norms.53
Given the private nature of family and parentage, one must ask why
states are so interested in defining families and parentage in such stark terms.
Certainly, many of us can point to relationships in our lives that might not
fit societal norms but still fulfill familial roles that society would find
46
D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 225 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 6th ed. 2016) (describing the “retreat from marriage”
that reflects a decline in the rate of marriage amongst adults and the increase in nontraditional families).
47
See Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based
Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 92 (2004) (discussing the “traditional” nuclear family model).
48
See id. at 116 (describing Nancy Polikoff’s functional approach to defining parentage).
49
Id. at 143.
50
Id. at 122.
51
See COTT, supra note 9, at 3 (describing societal gender norms and the assumed role of women
and men within the nuclear family).
52
Id. at 4.
53
See id. at 2–3 (describing certain models of marriage that are encouraged by the government).
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important and valid, even if they are not legally recognized. Despite this
reality, definitions of family and parentage in the United States are
heteronormative.54 When the phrase “American family” is used, it has
traditionally been associated with an economically middle-class, racially
white, and structurally nuclear family.55 In this family, the father goes to
work while the mother stays home with her children, one boy and one girl.
Obviously, this mythical “American family” is far from the American
truth.56 But it is important to recognize this stereotype in the context of
family law because these assumptions and societal norms influence legal
conceptualizations of family. Over recent years, however, courts have begun
to recognize non-traditional families in a variety of contexts, and from that
recognition has come a slow but steady broadening of what it means to be a
parent in America.
II. TRADITIONAL MODELS OF DEFINING PARENTAGE
A legal parent is someone who, amongst other roles, is responsible for
making decisions about a child’s health, education, and well-being.57 When
the question of parentage ventures beyond the context of a man and woman
who conceive without assistance, many legal issues arise as to what rights
and obligations each parent has, especially if that parent does not have any
biological or legal relationship with the child.58 Legal parentage is often an
“all-or-nothing” analysis.59 For instance, an adoptive parent’s rights cannot
begin until a biological parent’s rights end.60 This legal analysis is ill-fitted
for the modern complexities of families.61 Often, under traditional
definitions of parentage, same-sex parents are disadvantaged or left
extremely vulnerable, particularly when they are not married.62
Same-sex couples do not define parentage in such heteronormative
terms, that is expecting a child to have one mother and one father. Therefore,
a same-sex parent faces seemingly insurmountable barriers in seeking
54
See Kavanagh, supra note 47, at 122 (discussing the stereotypes associated with the nuclear
family and how it does not reflect reality).
55
Id.
56
See id. at 92 (“Even in its heyday, millions of American families did not have access to the wealth,
racial privilege and geographic location necessary to establish the idealized nuclear family.”).
57
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES 1 (2019),
http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf.
58
See id. at 1–4 (describing various paths to parentage).
59
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 464 (1990).
See also id. at 471–72 (describing the current legal approach to parental disputes and the ongoing efforts
of courts to maintain a rigid two-parent family structure).
60
Id. at 470 (“Similarly, a stepparent cannot adopt a child if the child has a living parent of the same
sex as the stepparent and that parent does not consent to termination of his or her parental status.”).
61
Id. at 473.
62
Id. at 468–69.
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custody of children who are not biologically related to them. Whether
considering biological or social factors, children may have as many as five
parents who could potentially bring a claim of parental rights.64 Despite this,
courts have for the most part adhered to three main paths to parentage:
biology, arrangement, or marital presumption of legitimacy. While biology
may seem a simple route to parentage, modern technologies bring far more
complexity to many biological relationships than in the past when biology
was synonymous with “natural” conception.
A. Biology
A strictly biological perspective on parentage restricts family formation.
For instance, the proposition that a child can have more than one father has
been widely rejected.65 While many courts have worked to adhere to this
strict standard, the reality is parents compose a wide variety of people within
a child’s life and these relationships are far more complex than chromosomal
lineage.66 A series of Supreme Court cases dealt with the question of parental
rights, and the doctrine developed to specifically outline how parental rights
are constitutionally protected, including which parents are and are not
protected. Birth mothers (not in the surrogacy context) tend to benefit from
a biological presumption, meaning that their parentage is presumed because
of the act of giving birth.67 Biological fathers do not benefit from the same
presumption, particularly when they are not married to the birth mother and
therefore cannot benefit from the marital presumption.68 In fact, a biological
father may have fewer rights than a non-biological father who is married to
the birth mother.69 However, there are some protections in place, via
procedure, that can facilitate parental rights claims by unwed biological
fathers. For example, in 1972 the Court declared that unwed fathers are
63

See id. at 469 (describing the complexities of family formation and the fiction of familial
homogeneity).
64
See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 355 (1991) (“We now live in an era where a child may
have as many as five different ‘parents.’ These include a sperm donor, an egg donor, a surrogate or
gestational host, and two nonbiologically related individuals who intend to raise the child. Indeed, the
process of procreation itself has become so fragmented by the variety and combinations of collaborativereproductive methods that there are a total of sixteen different reproductive combinations, in addition to
traditional conception and childbirth.”).
65
Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 602 (2000). See also Polikoff, supra note 59, at 469–70 (describing
how few courts consider the possibility that a child may have more than one mother or father).
66
Polikoff, supra note 59, at 469–70; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504
(1977) (recognizing the importance of grandparents within the household/as part of the family).
67
Hill, supra note 64, at 354 n.8 (describing the “presumption of biology”).
68
See id. at 376 (discussing the case of Michael H. and the limited ability of a biological father to
seek parentage).
69
See id. at 376–77 (discussing Stanley v. Illinois and the Court’s recognition of a husband’s
parental rights over those of an alleged biological father).
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entitled to a hearing to determine their fitness and are not presumptively
unfit parents.70
Biology has maintained a mythical status in many courts despite
criticism from scholars. Further complicating matters, the birth certificate is
often argued by prospective parents as a method of determining parentage.71
But this method of identification is a legal fiction. Instead of determining or
creating parentage, birth certificates are merely intended to accurately reflect
the legal relationship between parent and child.72 The birth certificate does
not create such a relationship, but instead documents it.73 Biological limits
in defining the boundaries of parentage are expanded through certain
agreements.
B. Parentage by Arrangement
When considering parentage beyond biology, certain theorists indicate
that when considering an adult’s intention to be a parent, the existence of an
arrangement to procreate, whether formal or informal, should be
determinative of parental rights.74 Adoption and surrogacy arrangements are
examples of paths to parentage by agreement. When an adoption takes place,
prospective parents agree to take on parental rights and responsibilities and
an individual who would otherwise have parental rights must consent, or in
state-initiated custody cases have court consent, to have their parental rights
terminated.75 Adoption agreements can take place before birth but do not
become realized until the child is born. Similarly, surrogacy agreements
allow prospective parents to arrange for another to conceive and deliver their
child.76 Surrogacy agreements give rise to disputes both about who the
intentional parents are and also who the biological and presumptive parents
are.77 However, ending the analysis at whether there is the existence of a
biological or contractual relationship makes invisible many parent-child
relationships within the United States. It is further troubling that adoption
70

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658–59 (1972).
See Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
16, 2015) (reflecting a plaintiff’s claim of parentage, based in part on her name on the birth certificate).
72
See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 789 n.17 (Conn. 2011) (“We have never stated, and do not
hold today, that being named on a birth certificate as the parent to the child confers parental status on the
named person. A person who is named on a birth certificate as a parent to the child is so named on the
certificate as a function of the department’s responsibility to keep accurate records of vital records. The
birth certificate must accurately reflect the legal relationship between parent and child, but it does not
create that relationship.”).
73
Id. at 793.
74
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1820 (1993).
75
Hill, supra note 64, at 354.
76
Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze of Legal Motherhood,
33 CONN. L. REV. 127, 128 (2000).
77
See id. at 133–34 (providing an example of a dispute arising from a surrogacy agreement).
71
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and surrogacy agreements suggest “that power over children ought to be
defined by adults’ bargained for exchanges.”78
While parentage by agreement has certainly been an incredible and often
miraculous path for couples to become parents, critics of parentage by
agreement point out that certain agreements place individualistic interests
above those of the family.79 There looms a tension between children’s rights
versus parental rights. Scholars differ in opinion as to whose rights should
triumph when there is a conflict.80 Intentional and functional approaches are
needed to address the complexities of modern parent-child relationships.
Courts have attempted to include more parent-child relationships by
adapting older doctrines of legitimacy to potentially include same-sex
couples within traditionally heteronormative models of parentage.
C. The Marital Presumption of Legitimacy
Despite courts’ reliance on biology in determining parentage, the law
has always recognized some form of nonbiological parentage.81
The core rule for assigning parenthood to men historically—
the marital presumption—“both facilitated parental
recognition that departed from biological facts and cut off
claims to parental recognition based on biological facts.”
Conversely, nonmarital biological fathers generally had no
parental rights historically. Thus, contrary to the assertions of
some, the law has recognized and continues to recognize
nonbiological parenthood.82
While birth mothers are included within the “presumption of biology”
because of the very act of giving birth, the same cannot be said for fathers.83
Instead, a more complex doctrine emerged: the presumption of legitimacy
(also known as the marital presumption).84 The presumption addresses when
a child is born in the context of a legally recognized marriage. 85 While the
mother benefits from the biological presumption, the husband is presumed
to be the child’s natural father regardless of biological ties.86 The
presumption is deeply rooted in long-held concerns regarding the legitimacy
78

Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1820.
Id. at 1821.
80
See id. (discussing the differences in scholarly approaches to parental and children’s rights and
whose rights should prevail in a conflict).
81
Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA, 127 YALE L.J.F. 589, 593–94
(2018).
82
Id. (quoting NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2272).
83
Hill, supra note 64, at 370.
84
Glennon, supra note 65, at 550; NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2266.
85
Hill, supra note 64, at 372–73.
86
NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2289.
79
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of children. By presuming the husband to be the child’s father, the doctrine
was thought to prevent children from suffering the status of illegitimacy.88
While this presumption may appear to be biological in nature, it is far from
that. The presumption reinforces fatherhood as a status that is a function of
family relationships.89 The presumption would, for example, apply to a
husband who was not present at the time of conception.90
As it became recognized in the context of modern family formation, the
presumption was less about biological lineage and more about presumptive
parental recognition for the benefit of the child. This doctrine also began to
slowly expand to include same-sex nonbiological spouses.91 This expansion
of the presumption has generally applied to lesbian couples where one
spouse has a child and the other is then presumed to be the child’s other
parent.92 Despite the adaptation of this presumption and its seemingly
flexible application, courts have generally declined to recognize that a child
might in fact have more than two parents.93
Instead, courts usually come to a rigid conclusion about which
individual is the legal parent with parental rights to the child and which
parties are considered third parties who are legally strangers in that child’s
life.94 However, if neither marriage nor biology are the defining factors in
determining a parent-child relationship, is the marital presumption of
legitimacy still a relevant doctrine? When the marital presumption is applied
to same-sex couples, it rests not on biology, but on their intentions and
functions as parents.95 This seems to suggest that the presumption has the
capacity to embody a functional definition of parentage, or at the very least,
justify the incorporation of a functional definition.96

87

Hill, supra note 64, at 373.
Id.
89
Id. at 372.
90
See id. at 372–73 (describing how, at common law, a husband did not need to be physically
present at the time of conception in order for the presumption to apply; he could be at sea and still be
presumed to be the father).
91
See Nicole M. Riel, The Other Mother: Protecting Non-Biological Mothers in Same-Sex
Marriages, 31 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 387, 394 (2018) (providing Connecticut as an example of a state
that has expanded the presumption to same-sex couples); see also NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2291
(describing the expansion of the marital presumption).
92
See NeJaime, supra note 8, at 1190 (describing how a lesbian partner may be included within the
presumption, not because of biology, but because of her intent to be a parent).
93
See Polikoff, supra note 59, at 469 (arguing for more flexibility within the court system for the
child’s best interests).
94
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (holding that the presumption applied to
the mother’s husband, rendering the biological father a third party with no parental rights to the child).
95
NeJaime, supra note 8, at 1241–42.
96
Id. at 1242.
88
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D. Parental Rights and Best Interests of the Child
It is worth noting that there is an apparent tension between parental
rights doctrine and the best interests of the child analysis.97 The best interests
analysis focuses on the needs of the child rather than the competing claims
of the hopeful custodians.98 By focusing on the child rather than the
relationship between the parents or a parent’s desire to have custody of the
child, the conversation around parentage would certainly shift.99 Child rights
advocates are calling for a refocusing of the conversation.100 Instead of
working to secure children for adults who bring claims of custody, they
assert the law should start providing adults to children who need them.101
Courts have called into question whether it is truly in a child’s best interest,
emotionally and developmentally, to retain biological parentage for “some
abstract interest in truthfulness.”102 Instead of considering biology to be the
test of parentage, the true test can be found in the social relationship between
parent, or parents, and the child.103
The theory that every child should have exactly one mother and one
father denies the existence of nontraditional families and potentially
punishes children in nontraditional families for the mere fact that they do not
fit the societal mold. Furthermore, a strict approach to parent-child
relationships outlines that the legally recognized mother and father should
have all rights to the child, leaving any other interested party fully divested
of any claim of parental rights, regardless of their relationship with a child.104
As will be discussed further below, it is necessary to shift to intentional and
functional definitions of parentage. When the law fails to recognize these
nonbiological and nontraditional parent-child relationships, children are the
ones who are harmed the most. The harms can range from emotional trauma
to abrupt cut-offs to complete removal of financial and emotional support.105
This is a pressingly important concern in the national context but is equally
important on the state level and is indeed being addressed in some states.106
97

Hill, supra note 64, at 363.
Id.
99
See Kavanagh, supra note 47, at 133–34 (describing the Supreme Court’s dismissal of a child’s
best interest position in Michael H. v. Gerald D. and how the analysis would have been different had the
Court shifted its perspective to the child’s best interest).
100
Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1754–55.
101
Id. at 1812.
102
Glennon, supra note 65, at 589–90 (quoting Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 123 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994)).
103
Id. at 589.
104
Polikoff, supra note 59, at 469.
105
Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 902–03 (1984).
106
Some states have begun to venture beyond biology to reflect the complexity of children’s lives.
For example, Louisiana now recognizes dual paternity, allowing the child to retain multiple fathers if it
is in the child’s best interest. Glennon, supra note 65, at 602–03.
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E. Re-examining Parental Constructs
“Best interests of the child” emerged as a means to mitigate the older
view of children as property. Advocates are calling for a realignment of
family law and a shift of focus onto children.107 Such a shift would change
the role of parents from one of ownership to stewardship.108 This approach
to parentage tends to value the needs of the next generation most highly and
encourages adult partnership and collective responsibility for the well-being
of children.109 Where to place the focus is still hotly contested amongst
scholars; some call for a refocusing on the best interests of the child,110 while
others find this approach to be inadequate. For example, Katharine Bartlett,
a professor at Duke University specializing in Gender, Sexuality, and
Feminist Studies,111 criticizes the best interests analysis as still being too
individualistic in nature.112 Instead of placing children’s interests over
parents’ rights as the best interests test does, she advocates for a focus on the
parent-child relationship.113 Given the flaws in purely functional,
intentional, or best interests approaches, this Note advocates for a similar
approach of focusing on the existence of a parent-child relationship
regardless of other factors such as inter-parent relationships or the quantity
of already existing parent-child relationships. If a child happens to have
three nurturing, caring, and beneficial parent-child relationships, it hardly
seems practical or even ethical to cut one relationship off simply because of
the societal notion that only two parent-child relationships may exist at once.
This is hardly an easy undertaking. Parental rights are rather unique from
other rights given the delicate balance between state and individual interests
as well as the reality that in order to give all legal parental rights to one
individual, usually the other’s must first be extinguished.114 This is not the
case in every area of the law but remains so in the area of child custody and
parentage. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), for example, does
not restrict the number of parent-child relationships that may exist.115
Instead, the “specific facts of each situation will determine whether an
107

Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1754–55.
Id. at 1755.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Katharine T. Bartlett, DUKE U., https://scholars.duke.edu/person/Bartlett (last visited July 27,
2019).
112
Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1821.
113
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 303–04 (1988).
114
Bartlett, supra note 105, at 883–84.
115
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FS 28B, FACT SHEET #28B: FMLA LEAVE FOR
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(2015),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28B.pdf (“The FMLA does not restrict the number of
parents a child may have.”).
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employee stands in loco parentis to a child.” The FMLA illustrates this
refocusing; instead of asking what are the parents’ intentions or what is the
parents’ relationship like, it looks to the relationship between the parent and
the child to determine whether a parent-child relationship exists.117
It is not enough to assume “that an adult’s relationship (sexual or
otherwise) with a parent creates a caregiving relationship between that
person and the child . . . . It again focuses too strongly on parental ‘rights’
and presumptive statuses.”118 While this Note does not call for such a broad
approach that would allow any caretaker to claim full parental rights,
reconsidering societal constructs of parentage would allow for potential
parents to not be automatically excluded. It would open the door for more
beneficial and mutual parent-child relationships to have legal recognition.119
While reconfiguring societal constructs and norms may be far more daunting
than adopting the intentional and functional provisions of the UPA (2017),
these constructs regarding child and parent interests are operating in the
background. The sooner the legislature confronts the broader questions of
what is a family and how is it defined, the sooner parent-child relationships
will be protected.
III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DEFINING PARENTAGE IN CONNECTICUT
A. Same Sex Couples’ Marital Rights in Connecticut
Before the deciding of Obergefell,120 the Connecticut legislature,
beginning in 2004, addressed same-sex marriage equality by implementing
a statutory scheme that implemented civil unions as a means of gaining legal
status as a couple.121 Because same-sex couples only had access to civil
unions whereas their heterosexual counterparts had access to the full
institution of marriage, the parties in Kerrigan filed for summary judgment
on constitutional grounds.122 In Kerrigan, the Connecticut Supreme Court
116
Id. (“The fact that a child has a biological parent in the home, or has both a mother and a father,
does not prevent an employee from standing in loco parentis to that child.”).
117
Id. at 1–2 (defining in loco parentis and identifying some factors used by courts to determine
whether such a relationship exists between the individual and the child).
118
Kavanagh, supra note 47, at 129–30.
119
See id. at 143 (“The rewriting of the definition of ‘family,’ and a move away from the exclusive
family paradigm has radical potential. It challenges the systems of domination based on class, race and
sexuality that serve as the basis for too much of our family law and public policy. Instead, structuring the
role of the law and state as one of support rather than family-model enforcement begins to bring care into
our political sphere. Re-casting the legal language of family in a flexible, care-based way means that all
families can be recognized, protected, and supported in the actual caregiving work that they are doing—
a public policy that is good for parents, children, the state, and society as a whole.”).
120
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
121
Heather J. Lange, Life with Kerrigan: Issues in Advising Same-Sex Couples in Connecticut, 19
CONN. LAW. 28, 29 (2009).
122
Id.
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concluded that “the state has failed to provide sufficient justification for
excluding same sex couples from the institution of marriage.”123 Kerrigan
solidified many rights for same-sex couples in Connecticut, including
benefits in taxation, immigration, and probate matters.124 After the
recognition of same-sex marriage, discussions surrounding same-sex
parentage began to truly take form.125 The Kerrigan decision, while an
exciting and long overdue step forward, did not end all problems for samesex couples seeking parentage in Connecticut.
B. Parentage and Defining the Parent-Child Relationship
As discussed above, the societal construction of the American family
generally limits the number of parents a child may have to two. Furthermore,
in the legal context, if a child already has two legally recognized parents,
one parent’s rights would have to end in order for another parent’s rights to
begin.126 It seems as though society, and indeed our legislature, remains
entrenched in a biological and rigid definition of parentage. But both
common knowledge and common law tell us that there is far more to a
parent-child relationship than simply genetic ties.
In Connecticut, child custody is often considered by the courts in two
contexts: custody disputes between private individuals and proceedings in
which the State, via the Department of Children and Families (DCF),
becomes involved.127 Child custody matters are litigated under the
Connecticut General Statutes that provide for both termination of parental
rights as well as subsequent child adoption proceedings.128 It is helpful to
briefly examine parental rights termination grounds when considering the
parent-child relationship because courts are asked to consider the intent of
the legislature as well as what it means to have an ongoing parent-child
relationship.129 Courts, when confronted with the question of parentage,
123

Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008); see also Lange, supra
note 121, at 29 (quoting the Connecticut Supreme Court in Kerrigan).
124
Lange, supra note 121, at 29–31.
125
When Kerrigan was decided, significant barriers still existed for same-sex couples seeking
parentage. For example, even after Kerrigan, the Department of Children and Families could consider
sexual orientation when determining adoption, and many Connecticut statutes still employed gendered
language such as “husband” and “wife.” Id. at 31.
126
Bartlett, supra note 105, at 879.
127
See CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH LAW LIBRARIES, CHILD CUSTODY ACTIONS IN CONNECTICUT: A
GUIDE
TO
RESOURCES
IN
THE
LAW
LIBRARY
6
(2018),
https://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/Notebooks/Pathfinders/ChildCustody/childcustody.pdf (discussing the
“few legal avenues” where a person can obtain legal custody of a minor in Connecticut).
128
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-717 (Westlaw through enactments of public acts enrolled and approved
by Governor on or before July 3, 2019 and effective on or before July 1, 2019).
129
See In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 603 (Conn. 1991) (discussing the legislature’s intentional
decision to maintain the language “no ongoing parent-child relationship” as opposed to characterizing
that relationship as meaningful or otherwise).
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often look to termination statutes for guidance. When considering the
parent-child relationship in the context of parental rights termination
proceedings, Connecticut courts have recognized that a biological tie, or
even parental love, is not necessarily enough to establish a parent-child
relationship.131
Termination of parental rights is defined as “complete severance by
court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities,
between the child and [their] parent.”132 Connecticut courts have clearly
indicated that deference should be accorded to the parental relationship
given its significance and that termination of parental rights is “a most
serious and sensitive judicial action.”133 Because of this, there is ample
language from both the legislature and the courts regarding what constitutes
an ongoing parent-child relationship. Central to this ground for termination
is the question of whether the child has any present memories or feelings for
the parent.134 This is relevant in the context of same-sex couples and their
parental rights because it suggests that the State has already recognized that
there are factors beyond biology or contract that impact whether it is in the
child’s best interest for a legally recognized parent to maintain their parental
rights.
C. Relevant Case Law for Same-Sex Couples Seeking Parentage in
Connecticut
Connecticut, like other states, tends to privilege biological relationships
when considering parental rights, and thus opposite-sex married couples
tend to have an advantage that same-sex couples are deprived.135
Connecticut historically has recognized three paths to parentage:
conception, adoption, or consent pursuant to the artificial insemination
statutes.136 While these are the most well recognized paths to parentage, they
hardly reflect the full breadth of experience of Connecticut parentage. For
instance, the marital presumption is well-founded in Connecticut common
law given the state’s strong public policy favoring the legitimacy of
children.137 While the presumption has been applied in the context of
same-sex parental disputes in Connecticut, it is not necessarily clear how to
130

See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 788–90, nn.16–18 (Conn. 2011) (referencing Connecticut
statutes that deal with routes to parenthood, parent-child relationships, and termination of parental rights).
131
In re Ashley S., 769 A.2d 718, 725 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
132
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-707(8) (Westlaw through enactments of public acts enrolled and
approved by Governor on or before July 3, 2019 and effective on or before July 1, 2019).
133
In re Luis C., 554 A.2d 722, 726 (Conn. 1989).
134
In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 768 (Conn. 1992).
135
Riel, supra note 91, at 387–88.
136
Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 789 (Conn. 2011).
137
Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
16, 2015).
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apply the presumption in Connecticut and what its interaction is with
equitable parentage. Furthermore, Connecticut has a quasi-functional
definition of parentage in its approach to third-party visitation.
A seminal case in this area is a 1998 Connecticut Supreme Court
decision Doe v. Doe,138 concerning custody of a child born via surrogacy.
Upon the dissolution of their marriage, the plaintiff wife sought custody of
the child she had raised with her then husband, the defendant.139 While the
plaintiff and defendant had raised the child together, no adoption
proceedings took place that established the plaintiff, a nonbiological parent,
as an adoptive mother.140 In reviewing her claim, the court declined to apply
the equitable parent doctrine to include the plaintiff as a parent of the
child.141 The court went on to outline the various circumstances under which
it would recognize individuals as legal parents of a child; however, intended
parentage was not included in the court’s list.142 The court explained its role
as one that provides appropriate remedies rather than defining parentage.143
The Doe court construed both common and statutory law to include a narrow
set of circumstances under which nonbiologically-related individuals could
assume a parental role in a child’s life, and these circumstances necessarily

138

710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998).
The child at issue in the case was conceived via surrogacy and was biologically related only to
the defendant husband. Prior to their marriage, the defendant solicited a surrogate on Craigslist who
subsequently became pregnant. After the child’s birth, the surrogate mother and her husband did not
bring any claim of parentage. No adoption proceedings took place during the marriage despite the
plaintiff and defendant raising the child together for fourteen years. The trial court found that the child
was not an “issue of the marriage” because she was conceived a few months prior to the defendant and
plaintiff’s wedding. Furthermore, the lower court noted that the presumption of legitimacy pointed to the
surrogate’s husband being the legal father of the child as the child was born during their wedlock rather
than during the parties’ marriage. The trial court therefore found that it did not have jurisdiction to enter
custody orders in regard to the child because the child was neither an issue of the marriage nor adopted
by the parties, nor a natural child of one of the parties who had been adopted by the other. Id. at 1297–
1303.
140
Id. at 1300.
141
See id. at 1317 (“[I]mplicit in our analysis is that we reject the ‘equitable parent’ doctrine.”).
139

142

Although the statutes have never explicitly defined the contours of the concept of a
“child of the marriage,” our cases have interpreted that concept in a consistent manner,
both before and after the historic 1973 revision. A review of that case law . . . leads
us to conclude that the meaning of that concept . . . is limited to a child conceived by
both parties, a child adopted by both parties, a child born to the wife and adopted by
the husband, a child conceived by the husband and adopted by the wife, and a child
born to the wife and conceived through artificial insemination by a donor pursuant to
§§ 45a-771 through 45a-779.
Id. at 1314.
143
Id. at 1318.
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included proceedings such as adoption or a rebuttal of the presumption of
legitimacy.144
Doe v. Doe illustrates multiple approaches to parentage that are
available in considering statutory reform in Connecticut. The court first
considered the biological relationships at play. In Doe, the court referenced
the genetic ties that existed between the surrogate mother and the child.145
The court contemplated the presumption of legitimacy, as the lower court
had found that it applied to the surrogate’s husband due to the child being
born within that marriage, as opposed to the marriage between the plaintiff
and defendant.146 The court found that the presumption was sufficiently
rebutted due to the clear intentions of the defendant and plaintiff in raising
the child for fourteen years.147 Furthermore, the presumption would have
proved problematic in this case as it would be the surrogate’s husband who
could have been presumed to be a parent since the child was technically an
issue of the surrogate’s marriage, despite her giving the child up at birth.148
Ultimately, the court ruled that, given her active role in the child’s life, the
lower court should allow the plaintiff the opportunity to seek custody. The
court further alluded that there “was ample evidence in this record that, if
credited, would have been sufficient to justify an award of joint custody to
both parties.”149
More than a decade after Doe, in 2011, the Connecticut Supreme Court
was confronted with the question of whether an intended parent, not
biologically related to the child nor an adoptive parent, could “become a
legal parent of that child by means of a valid gestational agreement.”150 In
Raftopol v. Ramey, the court noted that Doe was decided prior to the passage
of new artificial insemination statutes.151 The court held that Connecticut
statutes did allow “an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational
agreement to become a parent without first adopting the children, without
respect to that intended parent’s genetic relationship to the children.”152 The
court provided the following hypothetical to illustrate their decision.
Suppose an infertile couple who desire to have children but
cannot supply the womb, the eggs, or the sperm . . . . These
intended parents would need to rely on third party egg and
sperm donors to produce embryos that are implanted in a
144
See id. at 1323–24 (holding that the presumption was sufficiently rebutted in this case as the
plaintiff and defendant participated in nearly every aspect of the child’s life since she was born).
145
Id. at 1300–01.
146
Id. at 1303.
147
Id. at 1323–24.
148
Id. at 1300.
149
Id. at 1324.
150
Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 784–85 (Conn. 2011).
151
Id. at 796.
152
Id. at 797.
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gestational carrier pursuant to a gestational agreement. If §
7-48a confers parental status only on biological intended
parents, the intended parents are not the parents of any
resulting child, nor are the gestational carrier, any spouse she
may have, the gamete donors, or any spouses each may have.
Every possible parent to the child would be eliminated as a
matter of law, yielding the result of a child who is born
parentless, not due to the death of the parents, but simply due
to elimination by operation of law.153
The Raftopol court therefore found that, even without formally adopting
a child, an intended parent who is party to a valid gestational agreement
gains recognition as a parent to that child and may have their name placed
on the birth certificate, regardless of any biological connection.154 Finally, it
is worth noting that Raftopol did not address intentional parentage in the
absence of such an agreement.
More recently, in 2015, a New Britain superior court considered the case
of a lesbian couple seeking divorce, Barse v. Pasternak.155 The parties’ civil
union of 2005 was converted into a legally recognized marriage in 2010.156
In 2008, the defendant became pregnant via artificial insemination. The
plaintiff never adopted the child and the parties never entered into a
gestational agreement.157 This removes the case from the previously
mentioned Raftopol decision because there was no agreement in place that
the court could have used to infer intent. In Barse, the defendant, seeking
sole custody, argued the marital presumption of legitimacy did not apply to
children born to married same-sex couples.158 The court noted that there was
no controlling authority on this matter in the state.159 The Barse court
therefore looked to Kerrigan and found guidance in the court’s holding that
same-sex and different-sex couples should be afforded the same rights and
benefits of marriage.160
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff was not the legal parent as she
did not comply with one of the three recognized paths to parentage:
conception, adoption, or gestational agreement.161 In regard to the legal
significance of parties’ failure to comply with artificial insemination
statutes, the Barse court found that neither the language nor the legislative
history of the statutes implied they were intended to be the exclusive means
153

Id. at 804.
Id.
155
No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2015).
156
Id. at *2.
157
Id.
158
Id. at *8.
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Id.
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Id. at *9.
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Id. at *3.
154

2020]

FOR THE CHILREN

433

162

to establish parentage.
The plaintiff further argued that the artificial
insemination statutes didn’t replace the common law marital presumption of
legitimacy. The plaintiff pointed to factors such as being named on the birth
certificate, the child being an “issue” of the marriage, and being an intended
parent. Therefore, she argued, the court should adopt the equitable parent
doctrine because to do otherwise would be discriminatory.163
The court in Barse was able to rely on equitable principles in order to
prevent the marital presumption of legitimacy from being rebutted in regard
to a nonbiologically-related same-sex spouse claiming parental rights.164
Equitable estoppel “differs from the equitable parent doctrine in that it does
not create a legal status, but rather prohibits the other party from opposing
that status.”165 The distinction between equitable estoppel and equitable
parentage is important. Equitable parentage focuses on the relationship
between the nonbiological parent and the child as opposed to equitable
estoppel, which deals mostly with the relationship between the parents as
well as the nonbiological parent’s reliance on the other parent’s
representations.166
The court noted that the plaintiff could use equitable principles (not
equitable parentage) to estop rebuttal of the presumption, but it was up to
the plaintiff to meet her burden of proof.167 In discussing equitable parentage
versus equitable estoppel, the court referenced a Michigan case, Atkinson v.
Atkinson.168 There, the Michigan Court of Appeals outlined three
considerations under the doctrine of equitable parentage: (1) the parent-child
relationship is mutually acknowledged; (2) the individual desires the right
to be a parent; and (3) the individual is willing to take on the responsibility
of child support.169 The Atkinson court subsequently found that the
nonbiological parent in that case was legally a parent.170 Connecticut has yet
to apply such a clearly functional definition of parentage.
162

Id. at *6–7. The court also discussed Laura WW. v. Peter WW., 51 A.D.3d 211, 217–18 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2008), in which the husband was considered to be the child’s father when the child was
conceived via artificial insemination. The court found the husband to be the child’s father even though
there was no written record of the husband’s intent to have a child. For further discussion of WW. v. WW.,
see Barse, 2015 WL 600973, at *6.
163
Barse, 2015 WL 600973, at *3.
164
Riel, supra note 91, at 394.
165
Id. at 402 (citing Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1334 n.16 (Conn. 1998) (Katz, J., dissenting)).
166
See Doe, 710 A.2d at 1334 n.16 (Katz, J., dissenting) (“I disagree with the defendant’s argument
that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable parentage are essentially the same. Although both
address the issues of representation and reliance, equitable parentage focuses primarily upon the
relationship between the nonbiological parent and the child whose custody is at issue, while equitable
estoppel focuses exclusively on the nonparent’s reliance on the representations of the parent.”).
167
Barse, 2015 WL 600973, at *14 (noting that this is a question of fact).
168
160 Mich. App. 601 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
169
Id. at 608–09.
170
Id. at 610–11.
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Connecticut courts have considered a quasi-functional definition of
parentage when employing the third-party doctrine. In Roth v. Weston,171 the
Connecticut Supreme Court engaged with this doctrine to work out the
parameters of third-party visitation and how to balance the best interests of
the child with the fundamental rights of a parent.172 The claim was brought
by the child’s maternal grandmother and maternal aunt seeking third-party
visitation rights.173 After the passing of the child’s mother, the defendant
father ceased contact with the plaintiffs, thus causing them to bring an action
for court-ordered visitation in the best interests of the child.174
Roth first engaged in a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court decision
Troxel v. Granville.175 In Troxel, the Court reviewed a Washington Supreme
Court decision that held a visitation statute to be facially unconstitutional.176
The plurality in Troxel, while hesitant to make a finding that all such statutes
were unconstitutional on their face, held that this particular statute was
unconstitutional in its application.177 It would have allowed two
grandparents to assert visitation rights over the parent’s right to decide who
interacts with their child.178 The Court held that the statute at issue was
overly broad and invaded the fundamental rights of parents to choose how
to raise their children.179 Further, the Court noted that the lower court “failed
to accord the determination of Granville, a fit custodial parent, any material
weight.”180
In defining the parameters of when the State may impose visitation upon
a parent, the Roth court stated that the best interests of a child are secondary
to the fundamental privacy interests of parents.181 The court clarified that in
the absence of abuse or neglect, the State’s interest in the child’s best interest
is outweighed by the constitutional protections afforded to legally
recognized parents.182 This assertion, at first glance, appears to be a major
obstacle for intentional and functional parents alike. Despite it being in the
best interest of the child to have that parent recognized, parental rights of
legally recognized parents are given more weight.183 However, the Roth
171

789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002).
See id. at 436 (discussing the defendant’s claim that the statute at issue violates his parental
rights to choose how to raise his child).
173
Id. at 433–34.
174
Id. at 434.
175
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
176
See id. at 57 (“Washington Rev. Code §26.10.160(3) permits ‘[a]ny person’ to petition for
visitation rights ‘at any time’ and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation
may serve a child’s best interest.” (alteration in original)).
177
Id. at 57–58.
178
Id. at 60–61.
179
Id. at 67.
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Id. at 72.
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Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 443–44 (Conn. 2002).
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Id. at 444.
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court went on to make an important connection. The court recognized that
in certain circumstances, such emotional ties are formed between a child and
legally unrecognized parent that denial of visitation may cause serious harm
rising to the level of abuse or neglect.
We can envision circumstances in which a nonparent and a child have
developed such substantial emotional ties that the denial of visitation could
cause serious and immediate harm to that child. For instance, when a person
has acted in a parental-type capacity for an extended period of time,
becoming an integral part of the child’s regular routine, that child could
suffer serious harm should contact with that person be denied or so limited
as to seriously disrupt that relationship. Thus, proof of a close and substantial
relationship and proof of real and significant harm should visitation be
denied are, in effect, two sides of the same coin. Without having established
substantial, emotional ties to the child, a petitioning party could never prove
that serious harm would result to the child should visitation be denied. This
is as opposed to the situation in which visitation with a third party would be
in the best interests of the child or would be very beneficial. The level of
harm that would result from denial of visitation in such a situation is not of
the magnitude that constitutionally could justify overruling a fit parent’s
visitation decision. Indeed, the only level of emotional harm that could
justify court intervention is one that is akin to the level of harm that would
allow the State to assume custody under General Statutes sections 46b-120
and 46b-129—namely, that the child is “neglected, uncared-for or
dependent” as those terms have been defined.184
While not explicitly applied in the context of same-sex parentage, the
Roth court exemplifies the value that an intentional or functional parent can
have in a child’s life. Without the proper protections, however, intentional
and functional parents face a high bar to even gain visitation with their child,
let alone custody or any semblance of full parental rights.185
184

Id. at 445.
While Roth calls for a demonstration of harm before denying a third-party visitation, courts in
other states have made the distinction between third parties and de facto parents who are in parity with a
legally recognized parent. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 163–64 (Wash. 2005), concerned the
custody of a child who was conceived during the relationship of two women: Carvin and Britain. Id. at
164. During their relationship, the couple decided to have a child. With the assistance of a family friend,
Britain conceived the child via artificial insemination. The couple then held themselves out to be the
parents of the child for seven years. Upon the dissolution of their relationship, Britain sought to end all
contact between Carvin and the child. Id. at 163–64. The Washington Supreme Court allowed for
recognition of a de facto parent, distinct from third-party status, without requiring a demonstration of
harm should the relationship cease. Id. at 176. Instead, the court considered whether:
185

(1) the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship;
(2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) the petitioner
assumed obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation;
and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have
established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature.
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In examining the aforementioned cases, Connecticut courts have come
up with a series of approaches to assist same-sex parents in being legally
recognized as parents. Whether this is by stretching the marital presumption
of legitimacy or applying equitable principles, the courts have worked to
provide equal footing to same-sex couples. Thus, even though Connecticut
courts have given considerable attention in select circumstances in which
married same-sex couples may seek parental rights, the question remains:
What about everyone else? Marriage is on a steady decline in the United
States.186 As discussed above, the definition of family is changing. However,
same-sex parents who have children in unmarried relationships continue to
lack the same protections as unwed fathers in different-sex relationships.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized the gaps in current
legislation noting that the legislature itself recognized that it has
“postponed” working on these issues.187 It is time for the legislature to
abandon this “piecemeal”188 approach and face issues of parentage head on.
This Note advocates for a change, albeit significant, in Connecticut
legislation that would incorporate provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act
(2017) and shift the conversation from a focus on parents and individualistic
rights to a specific focus on children and their relationship with their parents,
whether biological, contractual, presumed, intended, or functional.
IV. ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (2017) IN CONNECTICUT
Given the flaws with biologically based parental recognition and the
potential to focus more on parent-child relationships, the Uniform Parentage
Act (2017) (UPA (2017)) provides a model of what functional and
intentional definitions of parentage could look like in Connecticut.189 While
not binding, the UPA (2017) offers a means for states to reform parentage
statutes in a way that will hopefully promote uniformity across the
country.190 The UPA (2017) provides guidance as to who should be
considered a parent when there are multiple claimants191 and expands who
can be recognized as a parent with the purpose to protect actual parent-child
relationships.192 The newest version of the UPA came out in 2017 and is
significantly different from previous versions in a few important ways.

Id. at 176. Therefore, on remand, if Carvin could establish that she was a de facto parent, both mothers
would have fundamental liberty interests at stake.
186
COTT, supra note 9, at 203.
187
Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 801 (Conn. 2011).
188
Id.
189
Joslin, supra note 81, at 592.
190
Id. at 610.
191
Id. at 604.
192
Id. at 601–02.
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A. Restructuring of the Uniform Parentage Act
The UPA (2017) removed the gendered terminology, such as father,
mother, maternity, and paternity, that can be found in previous versions,
replacing those words with “parent” or “parentage.”193 This allows for
further inclusion of diverse families and also ease of administration
throughout the provisions of the Act.194 For example, the UPA (2017)
contains a revised holding out provision that is now more inclusive.195 The
holding out provision allows an individual to be recognized as a parent
“based on the individual’s conduct of living with the child and treating the
child as her own.”196 While the holding out provision has been included in
the UPA since its initial promulgation in 1973, this change in gendered terms
is highly significant as it now applies beyond just prospective fathers.197 The
UPA (2017) now contains gender neutral provisions concerning voluntary
acknowledgement of parentage (rather than paternity) and a de facto
parentage. 198
Beyond these provisions, the UPA (2017) also accounts for other
methods of parental recognition such as the marital presumption, assisted
reproduction, and surrogacy.199 Given the current gaps in Connecticut law,
the legislature should consider adopting a version of the UPA (2017). The
advantages of recent changes are outlined by advocates in the field and
cannot be overstated.200 By adopting the changes inherent in the UPA
(2017), Connecticut would be protecting parent-child relationships and
correct the State’s present failure in recognizing loving and supportive
relationships. The UPA (2017) would provide certainty to many Connecticut
families who are seeking to have children.201 Furthermore, it would make
the difficulties of family breakdown less traumatic for children because,
regardless of parent gender or sexual orientation, the process of parental
recognition would be laid clear.
B. Previous Attempts: The Connecticut Parentage Act
Connecticut case law reflects a general reluctance amongst the courts to
apply an equitable parent doctrine to claims of parentage by same-sex
couples. Therefore, the legislature is best situated to address the growing
193
Douglas NeJaime, What Is the Uniform Parentage Act of 2017 and Why Does Connecticut Need
It? 1 (Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with author).
194
Id.
195
Joslin, supra note 81, at 600–01.
196
Id. at 600.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 601.
199
Id. at 602–03.
200
See id. at 611–12 (discussing the implications of adopting the UPA (2017)).
201
Id. at 603 n.83.
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need for revised definitions of parentage. In early January 2019, during the
drafting of this Note, a bill rose in the Judiciary Committee that had the
potential to address many of the barriers discussed. The Connecticut
Parentage Act (CPA), as proposed, would have clarified who could be a
parent and how to establish parentage.202 This kind of legislation would be a
significant step in the direction of removing same-sex parents from their
current, often vulnerable, legal status.203 As of February 2019, the proposed
bill was pulled from committee and is being redrafted possibly for the
following legislative session in early 2020.204
As definitions of parentage change, new definitions must be realistically
operationalized, otherwise parentage will cease to be a helpful legal doctrine
and will be reduced to nothing more than theory.205 While not denying the
importance of biological lineage, there is a great need to expand the
definition of parent to include social factors that contribute to parent-child
relationships.206 This urgent need to change definitions of family stems from
the fact that there are so many other kinds of families that go beyond
“traditional” concepts of the nuclear family. Whether it be parents who
employ modern technology to conceive and have children, or parents who
have no biological relationship to their children at all, these parent-child
relationships must be examined within the context of the relationship to the
child.
It is true that Connecticut has begun to expand the presumption of
legitimacy to stretch and include same-sex couples seeking parentage;
however, its application is unsatisfactory and limited. Marriage rates
202

See NeJaime, supra note 193, at 1 (on file with author).
See generally id. (discussing the necessary changes that would occur should Connecticut adopt
the UPA (2017)).
204
E-mail from Douglas NeJaime, Anne Urowsky Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., to Hannah
Kalichman, Student, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (Feb. 26, 2019, 7:27 EST) (on file with author).
205
See Hill, supra note 64, at 361 (describing that changing the definition of parenthood too much
may diminish its social significance).
203
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Consider just a few examples. In Connecticut, a married different-sex couple had a
child through surrogacy and raised the child together for fourteen years. When they
divorced, the court deemed the mother, who had neither a gestational nor genetic
connection to the child, a legal stranger to her child. In Florida, an unmarried same-sex
couple used the same donor sperm to have four children, with each woman giving
birth to two children. They raised the children together until their relationship ended
several years later, at which point the court left each woman with parental rights only
to her two biological children. In New Jersey, a male same-sex couple used a donor
egg to have a child through a gestational surrogate. The court recognized the
gestational surrogate, rather than the biological father’s husband (and the child’s
primary caretaker), as the second parent.
NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2265 (citing Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998); Russell v. Pasik, 178
So. 3d 55, 59–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 3250 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009)).
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continue to decline nationally while nonmarital cohabitation becomes
progressively less taboo.207 As children are born out of wedlock without the
once detrimental consequences of “illegitimacy,” the logic of having
marriage dictate much of parental rights seems diminished. Nationally a
trend has begun to develop that favors a functional, social definition of
parentage. This definition includes the individuals who function as a parent
in a child’s life. The question now is not whether to recognize parentage in
the absence of a biological relationship, but how.
Given Connecticut’s active work towards promoting marriage equality,
it is time for the state to follow through and fully protect parent-child
relationships that are outside the traditional, heteronormative narrative.
While the UPA (2017) has not yet been adopted in a great number of
states,208 the next sections describe two legislative proposals that are guided
by the UPA (2017): one advocates for the adoption of an intentional
parentage framework that would allow parents to establish their status even
before the child is born, and the other advocates for a functional, de facto
definition of parentage to better address situations where the question of
parentage is litigated later in the parent-child relationship.
C. Intentional Parentage
In the context of child custody, courts already employ an intent-based
analysis in certain situations outside of the context of the UPA (2017). For
example, when there are conflicting claims amongst biological relatives,
many courts will then consider intentionality as a dispositive factor in
determining parental rights.209 Additionally, adoption is a quintessential
example in which a person’s intent to be a parent counts in their claim for
parentage. 210 Granted, adoption is reinforced by agreement, but it is an
example of a “strong social tradition of recogniz[ing] the purely social and
psychological dimensions of parenting.”211 When a child is conceived via
artificial insemination and a surrogate is used, potentially three mothers may
have claims of parentage.212 In California, for example, the state supreme
court gave priority to a commissioning mother’s claim of legal parentage,
207

COTT, supra note 9, at 203.
Thus far, only three states, Washington, California, and Vermont, have adopted versions of the
UPA (2017). Parentage Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/
community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited July 27,
2019).
209
See Hill, supra note 64, at 386 (discussing the Baby M case and the considerations of intention
in the surrogacy context).
210
See Hurwitz, supra note 76, at 146 (discussing how intent to place a child up for adoption is
“multidimensional and complicated,” despite court reliance on contracts as exclusive evidence of intent).
211
Hill, supra note 64, at 354.
212
See Hurwitz, supra note 76, at 135–40 (describing priorities of the courts to honor claims of
motherhood by genetic mothers, intentional mothers, and gestational mothers).
208
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213

finding intent to be the “tie breaker.” This lends support to the argument
that a parent’s pre-birth intent to be a parent is a valid and important factor
in considering parental rights.214
Vermont is one of the first states to adopt a version of the UPA (2017):
the Vermont Parentage Act.215 In Sinnott v. Peck, the Vermont Supreme
Court was confronted with a scenario that the UPA (2017) was intended to
address: a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship who had not
legally adopted the child, was not married to the child’s legal parent, and
sought legal recognition of their parent-child relationship.216 The couple in
Sinnott had mutually decided to proceed with an adoption from
Guatemala.217 Due to extenuating circumstances, the couple agreed that the
defendant would formally seek the adoption given her past experience with
the process.218 After the relationship ended, the couple continued to coparent the child for three years before the defendant stopped allowing the
plaintiff to see the child.219
The plaintiff brought an action in Vermont Superior Court seeking legal
recognition as a parent under the Vermont Parentage Act.220 The Vermont
Supreme Court focused on the legislative intent of adoption statutes and their
general aim of promoting child welfare.221 In discussing relevant Vermont
caselaw, the court noted that instead of basing parentage off of the parents’
relationship status alone, the courts look to a series of factors including the
nature of the inter-parent relationship, a mutual intention to co-parent,
participation in decision making, and the fact that no other person is claiming
parental status.222 These factors echo the considerations outlined in the UPA
(2017) and allowed the court to recognize the important parent-child

213

Id. at 135.
Id. See also Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1757 (describing the “gestational father” who supports
and nurtures the mother during pregnancy, a role that modern definitions often omit when determining
parent-child relationships). However, it is also important to note here that critics of intentional parentage
caution against a purely intentional approach. They point to incidents of accidental conception where the
initial intent to be a parent may be lacking but the functioning of a parent later comes to exist. Hill, supra
note 64, at 387.
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VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 15C, § 101 (Westlaw through 2019 portion of 2019–2020 Legis. Sess.);
GLAD, Putting Children First: More Courts Recognize Today’s Families, GLAD LEGAL ADVOCATES
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relationship that existed in this case based off the individual’s intention to
be that child’s parent.223
Beyond defining intentional parentage, the UPA (2017) includes a
voluntary acknowledgement of parentage provision that promotes the
recognition of an individual’s intention to be a parent. This allows same-sex
couples the opportunity to engage in family planning and hopefully assert
their intentions to become parents prior to the birth or adoption of a child.
Prior versions of the UPA included only the establishment of paternity
through this administrative process.224 In contrast:
UPA (2017) makes Article 3 gender neutral and refers to the
establishment of parentage through the acknowledgement
process for an alleged genetic father, an intended parent, and
a presumed parent, allowing Article 3 to apply to both men and
women. The gender-neutral language and addition of the term
“intended parent” is consistent with one of the goals of this
revision process, which is to ensure that UPA (2017) applies
equally to same-sex couples.225
The UPA (2017) sets forth a procedure through which individuals may
voluntarily acknowledge their parentage so long as their acknowledgement
is not in conflict with another individual’s established parental status.226
Although significant as a means of providing same-sex couples with a route
to parentage, the UPA (2017) continues to reinforce the societal assumption
that a child may only have two legally recognized parents.
A purely intent-based test has been criticized as implying that an intent
to parent equates to the ability to parent, which is certainly not an accurate
assumption.227 There are numerous examples of parents who had every
intention of being a good and loving parent to a child but failed for one
reason or another.228 Some states, such as New Hampshire and Virginia,
have imposed measures to safeguard against potential dangers of intentional
223

See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). The majority in Sinnott agreed
with the dissenting opinion that there was a great need for the legislature to act in this area of Vermont
law. The majority’s discussion of the role of the court in defining parental doctrine helps to illustrate the
tension that often arises between courts interpreting existing statutes and the constraints imposed by the
lack of new legislation. It is imperative that legislatures update parental legislation so as to enable courts
to fully adjudicate these claims. Sinnott, 180 A.3d at 573–74.
224
Joslin, supra note 81, at 603–04.
225
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 3 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
226
Id. § 302.
227
Hurwitz, supra note 76, at 143.
228
See id. at 144 (“There are alarming examples underscoring this point. Recently, a surrogate
mother brought wrongful death and survival actions against a surrogacy clinic after the clinic’s client, a
sperm donor and commissioning parent, repeatedly abused and eventually murdered the child born of the
surrogacy. In New York, a father was convicted of first-degree manslaughter in the brutal homicide of
his six-year-old adopted daughter.” (footnotes omitted)).
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parentage. These measures include judicially pre-approving surrogacy
contracts and imposing home studies of intended parents to “determine
suitability for parenthood.”229 Notably, such fitness inquiries are not
required of a heterosexual couple who conceive outside of an assisted
process.230 While providing safeguards for children is a strong state interest,
lawmakers must also be cautious not to over-burden same-sex intentional
parents who lack the protection of a contractual agreement indicating their
intent to parent.
By adopting the voluntary acknowledgement of parentage provision
under the UPA (2017), Connecticut would be setting same-sex couples up
for success. This particular provision would allow for pre-birth planning,
which would promote thoughtful and intentional family formation that
would reduce the chances of litigation during the child’s life. It would
promote both parental interests in control and custody of their children as
well as the child’s best interests due to the increased chance of permanency
and consistency in the child’s life. This intentional approach will not address
all custody obstacles facing same-sex couples, and parents more broadly.
Particularly, it is important to consider how to approach parentage when the
child’s parent may not have been an intended parent pre-birth but certainly
functions as a parent in the child’s life.
D. Functional Parentage
The UPA (2017) outlines a functional, de facto parentage provision.231
This embodies what many states already do to recognize functional
parent-child relationships. Section 609 of the UPA allows for individuals
who stand in parity with legally recognized parents (regardless of biological
relation) to be recognized as parents.232 The de facto parent doctrine differs
from the holding out provision in as much as it allows claims of parentage
to be brought at different times in the child’s life.233 In order to bring a claim
under the holding out provision, one must have held the child out as one’s
own since the child’s birth.234 However, both de facto parentage and the
holding out provision require the existence of an ongoing parent-child
relationship but embody different relationships in regard to when they came
to be.235
When considering a claim of de facto parentage, the court may consider
a series of factors as outlined by the UPA (2017). These factors include
229

Id. at 144–45.
See id. at 145 (discussing the applicability of such fitness inquiries only in the contexts of
adoption and surrogacy).
231
Joslin, supra note 81, at 601–02.
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whether the alleged parent: (1) “resided with the child as a regular member
of the child’s household for a significant period”; (2) “engaged in consistent
caretaking of the child”; (3) “undertook full and permanent responsibilities
of a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation”; (4)
“held out the child as the individual’s child”; (5) “established a bonded and
dependent relationship with the child which is parental in nature”; (6) had
this bonded and dependent relationship with the child that was “fostered or
supported” by another parent of the child; and (7) has a relationship with the
child, the continuation of which would be in the best interest of the child.236
There are examples of de facto parentage that can help to illustrate the
implications of enacting such a provision. Delaware, for example, describes
that when a legal parent
“foster[s] the formation and establishment of a parent-like
relationship between the child and the de facto parent,”
parental status can be established by a showing that the de
facto parent “exercised parental responsibility for the child”
and “acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to
have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the
child that is parental in nature.”237
While Delaware has not adopted the UPA (2017), its de facto parentage
provision seems to echo similar factors that are outlined in the UPA (2017).
De facto parentage can address situations beyond the context of same-sex
couples including stepparents, grandparents, and cohabitating partners.238
New York approached de facto parentage from common law, rather than
legislation. Relevant caselaw illustrates the implications of enacting a
functional parentage doctrine. By examining these cases both advantages
and consequences of enacting functional parentage become clear. Brooke
S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.239 altered the definition of parent in New York.240
During this case, LGBT advocates at the Sanctuary for Families argued for
the adoption of an intent-based test that would act as an “equality measure”
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UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
Douglas NeJaime, The Story of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.: Parental Recognition in the
Age of LGBT Equality, in REPRODUCTION RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES (Melissa Murray et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2019) (preliminary draft at 13) (on file with author) [hereinafter NeJaime, The Story]
(quoting DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 8–201(c) (2017)).
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61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016).
240
From 1991 until 2016, New York operated on a narrow definition of parent. This was based on
the holding in Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), in which the court held that a partner
in an unmarried relationship was not considered the child’s “parent” for purposes of seeking custody or
visitation when that partner was not married to a biological parent or biologically related to the child
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for same-sex parents. However, in their brief, Sanctuary for Families also
cautioned against a more functional approach, describing it as “overbroad”
and requiring too much of a “case-by-case analysis [that] would empower
former abusive partners with no biological or adoptive connection to a child
to claim parental rights as a way to continue threatening their victims.”242 In
the case of Brooke S.B., the court applied an intent-based test without fully
foreclosing the possibility of applying a functional definition.243
Despite the words of caution by Sanctuary for Families, many LGBTQ
advocates call for a functional definition of parentage. Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) declares: “We believe (as with ducks)
that if it looks like a family, if it holds itself out as a family, and if it functions
like a family, then it is a family.”244 By allowing individuals who already
function as a parent in a child’s life to bring forth a claim of parentage, the
Connecticut legislature would be furthering the goal of protecting children
and keeping families intact. However, the legislature must be cautious when
drafting functional definitions of parentage. The concerns expressed by
Sanctuary for Families should not be ignored.
Professor Nancy Polikoff at the American University Washington
College of Law, echoes concerns regarding purely functional parentage
definitions and provides the example of an Oregon statute245 that attempts to
provide a functional avenue to parentage. 246 The statute allows anyone who
“has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a
child” to petition for custody or visitation.247 While this particular statute
may allow nonbiological lesbian mothers a path to parentage, Polikoff
cautions that this particular statute is over-broad in its application.248 While
advocating for a functional approach to parentage, Polikoff criticizes the
Oregon Supreme Court for its interpretation of this particular statute as not
focusing enough on the intent to parent and instead on the parental function
alone.249 Polikoff points out the advantages of including both function and
241
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intention in a definition of parentage, thus promoting a balance between
parental rights and the best interests of the child.250
Concerns that purely functional definitions of parentage are generally
messy and hard to apply is a sentiment that warrants consideration.251 A
solely functional definition leaves too much discretion to the judiciary to
decide what a functioning parent looks like.252 For example, another New
York case following Brooke S.B. illustrates that a de facto parentage
definition does have serious implications for parents. The case, K.G. v.
C.H.,253 concerned a lesbian couple who considered adoption of a child
during their relationship. The relationship came to an end, and Circe
Hamilton (C.H.), the defendant, continued with the adoption process without
Kelly Gunn (K.G.), adopting a child approximately a year after the break
up.254 Thus, K.G. is distinguishable from Brooke in that the parties’
intentions in the case are far less clear than in Brooke, where they were
beyond dispute.255
After the adoption, Gunn remained in both the child’s and Hamilton’s
lives, however, the trial court found that the mutual intention to adopt and
raise a child ended when the romantic relationship ceased.256 Upon
Hamilton’s decision to move, with the child, to Europe for work, Gunn
brought an action claiming she was a parent of the child with standing to
to decide its effect on the issue presented by this case, we note that the language used
is at least in some respects wholly consistent with this court’s previous decisions in
child custody disputes between natural parents and others. In such disputes, it would
never be proper to give custody to someone other than a natural parent unless custody
in the other person best served the child’s interests. The ambiguity of the sentence lies
in whether it would allow a court to deny custody to a natural parent if custody in
another would best serve the child’s interests. The answer turns on whether the
language “is appropriate in the case” calls for consideration of the custodial rights of
natural parents.
Polikoff, supra note 59, at 488.
250

Courts or legislatures looking for guidance in developing a new definition of
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seek custody and visitation. The court noted that “equitable estoppel
concerns whether a child has a bonded and de facto parental relationship
with a nonbiological, nonadoptive adult. The focus is and must be on the
child. It is for this reason that the child’s point of view is crucial whenever
equitable estoppel is raised.”258 While there was no preadoption plan
indicating an intent to parent,259 the court found the record inadequate to rule
on the applicability of equitable estoppel grounds and thus remanded the
case for further proceedings.260
The UPA (2017) addresses many of the aforementioned concerns by
weaving considerations of intent into a functional definition of parentage.
Furthermore, few advocates and courts, if any, have called for a purely
functional approach to parentage.261 For example, in 1995, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court adopted the de facto parentage doctrine, under which the first
factor to be considered was intent.262
Despite being known as the quintessential functional parent
test, the first element listed by Wisconsin goes to intent, not
function. The biological or adoptive parent must “consent[] to
. . . the establishment of a parent-like relationship.” The Court
explained that consent was important in order to “protect[]
parental autonomy and the constitutional rights” of the
biological or adoptive parent.263
The two doctrines are not in conflict. After all, it would be difficult for
one to function as a parent without also intending to be a parent, even if that
intention was not present at the outset of the child’s life.
E. The Advantages of Adopting Both Functional and Intentional
Definitions of Parentage in Connecticut
Defining relationships based on their function or an individual’s intent
is not necessarily a novel concept. Function has become a determinative
factor, or at least a persuasive one, in a wide range of contexts. Even in
popular children’s literature the concept of functional parentage has made
an appearance. 264 Beyond books, functional relationships have more
257
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himself to sit on Mayzie Bird’s egg until it hatches. When Mayzie returns claiming that hatchling to be
hers and not Horton’s, it is true that Mayzie’s claim is that which is traditionally recognized by the courts
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generally been recognized in the tenancy context, as illustrated by Braschi
v. Stahl Associates.265 The court in Braschi found that cohabitating same-sex
partners were to be included under the statute’s definition of family so as to
protect the surviving partner from eviction in the event of the named tenant
dying.266 The court came to this conclusion by objectively examining the
totality of the couple’s relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring,
and self-sacrifice within the relationship.267 The court considered the
exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the parties’ emotional and
financial commitment to one another, their reliance on one another, and how
they held themselves out to society.268 These considerations go beyond the
factual inquiry of whether the couple was married and fully encompasses the
function and intention of their relationship. By considering the relationship
in its entirety, the court was able to see that the couple fit within what the
legislature intended when referring to family in this context.269
Leading up to the Supreme Court’s finding in Obergefell v. Hodges,
courts expressed frustration with the limitations of the biological
construction of family. In Perry v. Brown,270 Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit dismissed the “argument that the purpose of marriage is ‘to
encourage child-rearing environments where parents care for their biological
children in tandem.’”271 The court further questioned the need for biological
ties when “family is about raising children and not just about producing
them.”272 In that particular case, the court “elevated functional parenting
over procreative sex, gender, and biology.”273 Further, prior to the
recognition of same-sex marriage, many opponents of its recognition would
point to the intention of same-sex couples to have children as a reason for
why same-sex marriage was unnecessary.274 In resisting and disregarding
these arguments, courts were reluctant to make distinctions between
different-sex procreation and assisted reproduction, implicitly signaling

features with Horton the elephant, implying that Horton’s intentions and functions as a parent had an
impact on his claim of parentage. For a full discussion of this analogy, see Woodhouse, supra note 74,
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acceptance of intentional parenting as a component of marital and functional
parenting.275
A small number of courts have adopted a more explicitly functional
approach to parentage. They have done this by applying the doctrine of in
loco parentis.276 This doctrine has its roots in common law and creates
parental rights and responsibilities in individuals who voluntarily provide
support for or take over custodial duties of a child.277 When these courts are
making their determinations, intent is a crucial consideration.278 Historically,
this doctrine often arises in the context of stepparents.279 Beyond the general
consideration of whether there is a parent-child relationship, courts
operating under this doctrine will grant custody, visitation, or other parental
rights if it is in the best interests of the child.280 Intentional parentage is
distinct from functional parentage in so much as it addresses planned family
formation.281 However, intent is an important consideration in functional
parentage. 282 It therefore makes sense for Connecticut to adopt both the
voluntary acknowledgment of parentage (intentional) and de facto
(functional) parentage provisions of the UPA (2017) so as to fully reflect the
complexity of parent-child relationships.283 This is further supported by the
reality that intentional parentage is a narrower prospective doctrine, and de
facto parentage a broader, more retrospective doctrine.284 Both provisions of
the UPA (2017) were designed to protect parent-child relationships, and
Connecticut’s adoption of these provisions would be significant in moving
towards protecting children and their parent-child relationships, particularly
in the context of same-sex couples seeking parental recognition.285
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CONCLUSION
The law should recognize the insiders in a child’s life even when they
do not fit the nuclear or exclusive model of parent, especially when the child
considers them to be an insider.286 While national and local origins of family
law are entrenched in heteronormative and exclusive models, this does not
have to dictate the future of family law in Connecticut. Non-traditional
families have driven a significant amount of parental doctrine development
thus far and they will continue to do so.287 Given the strides Connecticut has
made to advance state laws to be more inclusive, it is time for the legislature
to enact the voluntary acknowledgement of parentage and de facto
provisions of the UPA (2017).
As previously discussed in this Note, there are concerns that allowing
nonbiologically-related individuals to bring forth claims of parentage will
lead to an excess of claims and ultimately be harmful to children. Studies
have shown that there is no difference in quality of attachment between
adoptive and natural mothers and their children.288 Furthermore, redefining
parentage in functional and intentional terms would not erase the biological
or contractual parent-child relationships that have long enjoyed recognition.
By adopting the UPA (2017), there would be clear guidelines as to who may
bring a claim and what is required in order to be considered a parent. Parental
relationships would be analyzed under a functional and intentional approach.
While not harming biological relationships, this new approach to parentage
will validate many parent-child relationships that have been denied that
respect and security for years.289
Critiques and general reluctance to adopt the UPA (2017) reflect the
complex nature of parental rights. Unlike other rights enjoyed throughout
this country, parental rights are granted to one individual usually at the cost
of another.290 This is a framework that must be broken. Instead of forcing
286
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families to exist in an unrealistic and contrived paradigm of a two-parent
household, it is time for a reconsideration of how family and parent are
defined. Beyond simply who can be a parent, it is important to challenge and
question why only two individuals may have a bite at the apple. If a child
has more than two parent-child relationships, but only two may be fully
legally recognized, the best interests of the child seem to be in peril. Family
law, particularly around parentage and custody, must adjust its focus and
become re-centered on the individual to which all parties involved claim to
have great care and attachment: the child.
The potential for Connecticut to move away from the heteronormative
and restrictive definitions of parentage would greatly benefit same-sex
couples, their children, and non-normative families in Connecticut. It would
place children and their interests back in the foreground and highlight the
importance of examining the parent-child relationship as a whole. If
Connecticut adopts the voluntary acknowledgement of parentage and de
facto parentage provisions of the UPA (2017), courts would be given the
option to consider intentional and functional factors of parentage.291 The
UPA (2017) was not intended to eliminate genetic or biological ties; instead
it makes clear that while important, biological ties do not presumptively
trump other indications of a parent-child relationship.292 These new avenues
to parentage would protect children and same-sex parents whose
relationships are at risk under present law. While there are consequences to
including these definitions, the protection this would offer to parent-child
relationships and same-sex parents can no longer be ignored. The legislature
needs to recognize the vulnerability of same-sex parents in Connecticut and
act accordingly by adopting both the voluntary acknowledgment of
parentage and de facto parentage provisions of the UPA (2017). Not only
will this protect same-sex individuals’ parental rights but it will protect
important parent-child relationships so that a child is not punished for the
composition of their family.
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